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Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public 
Policy in Sweden
Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
4.1    Introduction
Sweden has long been at the forefront of creating innovative social insur-
ance programs. For nearly as long, these programs have undergone intense 
scrutiny of eﬀects on economic and social behavior. In terms of eﬀects on 
hours of work, the consensus of opinion is that male work hours are rela-
tively unresponsive to changes in the tax and transfer system, whereas female 
work hours appear to be (at least) slightly more responsive to economic 
incentives. Yet, this seeming nonresponsiveness of labor supply to tax and 
program incentives is surprising and unsettling. If incentive eﬀects are so 
important, as many economists believe, why are the eﬀects so elusive to 
recover empirically? Should one infer that there are no labor supply eﬀects 
from Sweden’s high marginal tax rates and generous (by U.S. standards) 
program beneﬁ  ts?
To address these and other questions, we continue the analysis of Arons-
son and Walker (1997). Our earlier study gave a broad overview of incentives 
generated by the Swedish tax, transfer, and social insurance systems, as well 
as an overview of labor supply behavior, with an emphasis on studies based 
on Swedish data. We also related the incentive structure to existing empirical 
results by focusing attention on the tax and beneﬁ  t reforms that took place 
in Sweden during the 1980s and early 1990s.
In this chapter, we consider labor supply trends and literature since our 
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ﬁ  rst study. Additional explanations emerge as possible reasons for the low 
responsiveness of work hours to taxes and transfers. We summarize this lit-
erature, and we review the related literature on why Swedes (and Europeans, 
in general) appear to supply much less market work than Americans do. Are 
diﬀerences due to higher tax rates in Europe and Sweden than in the United 
States, or are they due to the functioning of the labor market?
The last decade has witnessed an expansion from hours of work to con-
sider the incentive eﬀects on other dimensions of labor supply. Recent 
research considers the relationship between the tax system and before-  tax 
income. Pretax income reﬂ  ects hours of work, and it also reﬂ  ects eﬀort, 
occupational choice, wage formation, savings, and to some extent, tax avoid-
ance (depending on the income measure used). Therefore, we combine the 
study of tax base determination with results from traditional labor supply 
studies in order to get a better understanding of the relationships between 
economic incentives and behavior. We also brieﬂ  y address relationships, 
on the one hand between the tax system, and on the other, the union wage 
formation and tax avoidance. The incentives associated with unionized labor 
market are also relevant from perspectives other than just wage formation—
for instance, for understanding international diﬀerences with regard to work 
hours.
The shift in focus from hours of work to broader measures of labor supply 
is complemented by a shift in interest from the eﬀects of the income tax to 
the eﬀects of social insurance, and notably for Sweden, of sickness insur-
ance and pension problems. We review this literature and consider Sweden’s 
major pension reform of 1999. The consequences of demographic changes 
(particularly in connection with pay- as- you- go social security systems) have 
become increasingly important. The reform of 1999 is the latest example of 
Sweden’s innovative design of social insurance programs.
In summary, we will address the following questions:
￿    Why are the estimated eﬀects of taxes and transfers on hours of work 
typically modest? In the light of empirical evidence for Sweden, we will 
discuss whether social norms and quantitative constraints contribute 
to this outcome, as well as augment the standard labor supply model 
with tax avoidance behavior.
￿   Why are the estimated eﬀects of marginal tax rates on before- tax income 
typically larger than the corresponding eﬀects on work hours? Are issues 
such as tax avoidance and wage formation important here?
￿    What factors determine cross-  country diﬀerences with respect to work 
hours—in particular, diﬀerences between Sweden, other European 
countries, and the United States?
￿   How does the labor supply respond to health insurance and pension 
systems? The eﬀects of the pension system are particularly interesting 
to analyze because of (a) the major reform implemented in 1999 and 
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Although estimated labor supply elasticities on hours of work are low, as 
we argued in Aronsson and Walker (1997), behavioral responses to income 
tax and social insurance programs appear in other dimensions of labor 
supply. So, our answer to the second question posed in the ﬁ  rst paragraph 
is no—one cannot safely assume that labor supply does not respond to eco-
nomic incentives. We agree that large responses do not appear in (reported) 
hours of work, but for reasons presented next, we believe substantial 
responses appear in other dimensions. As the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2005) notes in a recent report, in 
light of these responses, Sweden faces important challenges regarding the 
structure of its social insurance programs and the tax programs necessary 
for their ﬁ  nance.
Before turning to this evidence, we ﬁ  rst consider recent trends in labor 
supply.
4.2      Trends in Labor Supply
Over the last ﬁ  fteen years, traditional measures of labor supply have been 
stable. Figure 4.1 presents labor force participation rates for three age groups 
by gender for Sweden and the United States for 1975 to 2004. Whereas labor 
force participation among Swedish youth equaled or exceeded that in the 
United States, since 1990, labor force participation in Sweden is 10 to 15 
percentage points less than in the United States. Participation rates among 
prime- age men are nearly identical over this period in the United States and 
Sweden. Among the oldest age group of men, the secular pattern of partici-
pation is quite similar across the two countries. Participation rates for this 
group are higher in Sweden and have been for thirty years.
Participation rates between the older two age groups of women vary 
between Sweden and the United States. The role of Sweden’s work-  related 
social insurance programs produce high rates of participation, as labor 
market participation in Sweden is substantially higher for women aged 
twenty- ﬁ  ve and higher. Also evident is the severe recession of the early 1990s, 
which was particularly harsh on the middle age group (aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve 
to ﬁ  fty-  four); participation rates fell sharply (approximately 10 percentage 
points) and had not yet fully recovered. Participation for women aged ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ ve to sixty-  four increased in both countries; however, Sweden’s recession 
depressed participation rates for this group but less so than for the younger 
age group.
Figure 4.2 presents the average hours of work per week (measured among 
those working) for three age groups by gender for the United States and Swe-
den for 1975 through 2004.1 Among Swedish males, hours of work declined 
for all three age groups, with hours falling most sharply for the youngest 
1. These are “usual weekly hours” as reported in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and 
“weekly hours of work” in the Labor Force Survey (AKU).Fig. 4.1    Labor force participation by age and gender, United States and Sweden: 
1975 to 2004
Note: Graphs by sex and age group.
Fig. 4.2    Average hours worked per week by age and gender, United States and 
Sweden: 1975 to 2004
Note: Graphs by sex and age group.Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 3 1
group. Hours of work among prime-  age workers (twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four) 
and mature workers (ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four) show little variation in the 
United States. However, in Sweden, hours of work fell during the recession in 
the early 1990s. Among women, hours of work declined for the youngest age 
group in Sweden and in the United States. For prime-  age women, hours of 
work increased slightly in both countries. For mature women, average hours 
in Sweden increased and narrowed the diﬀerence with U.S. mature women.
The sector of employment changed substantially for Swedish women 
during the 1990s. Figure 4.3 reports the sector of employment from 1970 
through 2002. Again, the recession in the early 1990s is visible, as the share 
of women in the local government sector declined precipitously at that time 
and never fully recovered. Employment in the local government sector stag-
nated, and women’s employment increased in the second half of the 1990s 
as employment in the private sector increased.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 4.4—which is based on the OECD (2005) country report 
for Sweden—reports by gender the population share not at work from 1990 
through 2003. Not at work includes individuals not in the labor force (e.g., 
those retired or in school full-  time), the unemployed, and employed indi-
viduals absent from work. The last group includes individuals on disability 
insurance, sickness insurance, vacation, and temporary layoﬀ.2 We com-
bine these diﬀerent groups of nonworkers to avoid arbitrary labels of the 
diﬀerent subpopulations.3 The striking feature of this graph is the level of the 
curves—slightly more than 1 in 2.5 women and roughly 1 in 3 Swedish men 
are not actively working. And consistent with the trends in ﬁ  gures 4.1 and 
4.2, the share of inactives increased during the recession of the early 1990s 
and stabilized at this higher level into the new century. The OECD (2005) 
country report for Sweden notes that Sweden has one of the highest levels 
of labor market inactivity levels (rivaled only by the other Nordic countries). 
This is an ominous trend for Sweden. Arguably, this increasing proportion 
of nonworkers provides long-  run evidence of the work disincentives within 
the Swedish system that oﬀers relatively generous (again by U.S. standards) 
income support with high rates of income taxation, which lessen the need 
of and the returns to market work.
4.3      Hours of Work: Some Evidence for Sweden and Extensions
To provide a starting point for the analyses, consider the simple labor-
 leisure model that forms the basis of empirical work on labor supply, where 
2. The OECD (2005, 60) report notes that Sweden leads the OECD in the average number 
of days lost per year because of sickness. And Sweden has a relatively large share of potential 
workers who do not participate in the labor market because of medical reasons, especially 
among older age groups. Palme and Svensson (2002) report as well that sickness insurance and 
disability insurance systems serve as unoﬃcial forms of unemployment insurance.
3. Thus, we want to avoid distinctions between unemployed and discouraged workers, neither 
of which is employed, and only the unemployed are considered in the labor force.132        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
the individual chooses the hours of work and the consumption of a single 





  u(c, h; z),
subject to wh  y –   T (wh, ytax) –   c  0, in which c is consumption, w is the 
gross wage rate, h is the hours of work, y is the nonlabor income, z is a vector 
of observable characteristics, ytax (which is part of y) is the taxable nonlabor 
income, and T(￿) is the tax payment net of transfers. The outcome of this 
problem can be written as a labor supply function:
(1)  h  g(wn, yn; z),
where wn  w(1 –   T) is the marginal wage rate, and T  T(￿) /   (wh) is the 
marginal eﬀect of the tax and transfer system, while yn typically is referred 
to as the virtual nonlabor income (which we obtain by linearizing the budget 
constraint around the optimum point).
The model serves to deﬁ  ne the basic labor supply responses to changes in 
the budget constraint. The income eﬀect, h /   yn, is the change in hours of 
work in response to an increase in the virtual nonlabor income. If leisure is a 
normal good, the income eﬀect is negative (i.e., an increase in income induces 
Fig. 4.3    Number of women employed, aged sixteen to sixty-  four, by sector: 1970 to 
2003
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 3 3
the individual to consume more leisure and thus to work less). The compen-
sated wage eﬀect, h/  wn|u, measures the change in hours to an increase in 
the marginal wage rate, holding constant the consumer’s utility. This eﬀect 
captures the price or substitution eﬀect. By the law of demand, the com-
pensated wage eﬀect is nonnegative. The compensated eﬀect is important, 
because the welfare cost of taxes is proportional to the compensated wage 
eﬀect. Finally, the uncompensated wage eﬀect, h/  wn, summarizes the (net) 
change in hours with an increase in the marginal wage rate (which includes 
both the substitution and income eﬀects).4
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarize a large number of studies pre-
senting estimates of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity with respect 
to the marginal wage rate (henceforth called wage elasticity) and the income 
elasticity. Estimates of the wage elasticity for men are typically small; most 
studies cover the interval from slightly negative point estimates to point 
Fig. 4.4    Percent of the population, aged sixteen to sixty-  four, not at work: 1980 to 
2003
Source: OECD country report for Sweden (2005).
4. Readers interested in more thorough reviews of diﬀerent labor supply models, as well as 
the econometric methods typically associated with them, are referred to Blundell and MaCurdy 
(1999).134        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
estimates around 0.15. The estimates of the income elasticity are typi-
cally negative and relatively small in absolute value, although the variation 
between studies regarding the income elasticity appears to be greater than 
the corresponding variation with respect to the wage elasticity. For women, 
the picture is somewhat diﬀerent; both the wage and the income elasticities 
are typically estimated to be larger in absolute value than the corresponding 
elasticities for men, suggesting that women’s hours of work are generally 
more responsive to economic incentives than are male hours of work.5 The 
higher wage elasticity for women may also reﬂ  ect that women work fewer 
hours on average than men. Studies based on Swedish data yield a similar 
conclusion (see Aronsson and Walker 1997).6 The appendix gives a brief 
summary of empirical results.
4.3.1      Responsiveness to Taxation and Programs
Clearly, one cannot infer the consequences of major reforms in the tax 
and transfer systems just by looking at the elasticity measures previously 
discussed. In this subsection, therefore, we brieﬂ  y review some attempts to 
measure the labor supply responses to changes in the tax and transfer sys-
tems—again with a focus on results based on Swedish data. Aronsson and 
Palme (1998) estimate a household labor supply model using data from 1980. 
The model then is used to compute the desired hours of work for the hus-
band and the wife, respectively, under three tax and transfer systems: 1980, 
1989, and 1991, respectively (where the changes refer to the income tax, the 
value added tax, the housing allowance, and the child allowance).7 Their 
results show an average 2.1 percent increase in the desired hours of work for 
the husband and a 0.7 percent increase for the wife due to the switch from 
the 1980 to the 1989 system. The main explanation for the seemingly small 
response in the wife’s hours of work is a negative cross- wage eﬀect (from the 
5. Until recently, it was common to consider women as secondary workers, with men as 
primary workers. The greater labor supply responsiveness of women often was attributed to 
their movement in and out of the labor market.
6. See also the more recent studies of male labor supply by Blomquist, Eklöf, and Newey 
(2001) and Blomquist and Newey (2002) and the study of household labor supply by Flood, 
Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004). The own-  wage elasticity of women’s labor supply presented by 
Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg is lower than the estimates presented in many earlier studies on 
labor supply based on Swedish data.
7. The most important changes refer to the income tax system. In Sweden, the income tax 
system contains two parts: a nonlinear national income tax and a proportional local income 
tax. (The local tax rate varies across local jurisdictions, and the average rate is slightly above 
31 percent.) In the early 1980s, the national income tax was highly progressive with many tax 
brackets; for instance, in 1980, the tax rates of the national income tax schedule ranged from 0 
to 58 percent, depending on the level of taxable income. In addition, labor income and capital 
income were taxed jointly, and capital losses were deductible from the labor income when 
computing the taxable income. Together with the local tax rate, an average earner may have 
faced a marginal income tax rate of around 50 percent, and the top rate exceeded 80 percent. 
The tax reform implemented during 1983 to 1985 meant splitting the national income tax into 
two parts: a basic part and a supplemental part. Nearly all income earners paid the basic tax, 
and this tax schedule had two brackets (with tax rates equal to 5 and 17 percent, respectively, Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 3 5
increase in the husband’s marginal wage rate), accompanied by a relatively 
large income eﬀect from the transfer system. The corresponding changes in 
desired work hours due to the shift from the 1989 to the 1991 system are 3.1 
percent for the husband and 2.8 percent for the wife, respectively. Blomquist, 
Eklöf, and Newey (2001) use data from 1973, 1981, and 1991 to estimate 
the labor supply of married men aged twenty to sixty. The estimated model 
is used to simulate how the desired hours of work respond to the change in 
the tax and transfer systems between 1980 and 1991 (where the change refers 
to the income tax, the value added tax, the payroll tax, the child allowance, 
and the housing allowance). The average response in the desired hours of 
work is estimated to be 2.2 percent. (If evaluated in isolation, the changes in 
the marginal income tax rates cause the desired hours of work to increase by 
approximately 4 percent.) Our interpretation is that the estimated eﬀects are 
relatively small, considering the magnitude of the reforms. We shall return to 
the 1991 reform in section 4.6, where we more fully explore the relationship 
between the marginal tax rate and the before-  tax income.
Other types of policy-  reform simulations based on Swedish data refer 
to combinations of deductions and transfer payments. This is interesting, 
because certain transfer payments may give rise to important marginal eﬀects 
of relevance for the labor supply decision. Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg 
(2004) estimate a household labor supply model using data from 1993 and 
1999. Their model then is used to analyze the labor supply responses among 
married men and women to a substantial increase in the basic deduction, in 
combination with reduced housing allowances and welfare beneﬁ  ts (by 25 
percent each). The results show very small (almost negligible) eﬀects on the 
desired hours of work, except for low-  income households (where the labor 
supply increase is substantial for women).
4.3.2      Does the Standard Model Capture All Relevant Eﬀects?
As many studies on labor supply refer to time periods with increases in 
women’s labor force participation, it is not surprising to ﬁ  nd that women’s 
hours of work are generally more responsive to economic incentives (mea-
sured in terms of the wage and income elasticities) than are the hours of work 
in 1989). The supplemental tax, which contained higher tax rates, only was paid by those with 
suﬃciently high income. Capital losses could still be deduced from the tax base for the basic 
tax, although it could not be deducted from the tax base associated with the supplemental tax 
(implying that the latter tax base was broader). The top rate for the national income tax was 42 
percent in 1989. In 1991, an additional (and major) tax reform was implemented, which meant 
introducing a simpler national income tax system with two tax brackets for the labor income 
tax; the national tax rate was set to 0 for taxable incomes below 170,000 SEK (i.e., individuals 
with lower levels of income only paid the local income tax) and to 20 percent for higher incomes. 
It also implied a broader tax base by including some previously fringe beneﬁ  ts, as well as sepa-
rate taxation of capital income (including capital gains) at 30 percent. By analogy, 30 percent 
of net capital losses were made deductible from the labor income tax payment. Another part 
of the reform was to increase the value added tax. For a more detailed discussion, see Arons-
son and Walker (1997).136        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
supplied by men. In addition, the labor supply results for women seem to 
vary more across studies than do the corresponding results for men, indicat-
ing (perhaps) that it is more diﬃcult to reach a consensus regarding wom-
en’s labor supply; more recent research—for example, Flood, Hansen, and 
Wahlberg (2004)—suggests a relatively low responsiveness of women’s labor 
supply to economic incentives. The results from studies on male labor supply 
are surprisingly stable over time and across countries, in the sense that the 
estimates of the wage and income elasticities typically are found to be rela-
tively small in absolute value. How can we explain this seemingly stable result? 
Does it mean there are no substantive responses to taxes and/  or transfers?
To answer the second question, we ﬁ  rst draw on Slemrod’s (1992) behav-
ioral hierarchy of response. This perspective recognizes that decisions involv-
ing transactions are the most responsive, followed by a variety of ﬁ  nancial, 
accounting, and avoidance decisions. Real decisions involving savings, labor 
supply, and investment are the least responsive. In section 4.6, we consider 
some of the other responses to assess other possible eﬀects of the tax. To 
answer the ﬁ  rst question of why the real labor supply eﬀects are so small, 
one possibility, of course, is that the standard labor supply model is correct, 
in which case the explanation has to do with the preferences for the trade-
 o ﬀ between consumption and leisure. However, alongside this (unlikely) 
explanation, other studies try (at least in part) to attribute this ﬁ  nding to the 
character of the standard labor supply model by arguing that it neglects vital 
aspects of either the preferences or the choice set. We will discuss some of 
these approaches next by extending the standard model in order to capture 
quantitative constraints, social norms, and tax avoidance, respectively.
4.3.3    Quantitative  Constraints
By quantitative constraints, we normally mean demand-  oriented con-
straints, such that individuals facing them are oﬀ their labor supply curves. 
The presence of such constraints, at least in principle, can explain why 
the hours of work appear to be relatively unresponsive to small changes 
in the marginal wage rate and the virtual nonlabor income, respectively. 
Using Swedish data on prime-  age married men from 1980, Sacklén (1996) 
addresses the issue of quantitative constraints. His study makes use of a 
question posed to the participants in the Level of Living Survey, where the 
respondents were asked to say whether they were satisﬁ  ed with their work 
hours or if they wanted to increase or decrease their hours of work, given 
a corresponding change in their income. Those who claimed to be rationed 
in this sense were treated as if they were oﬀ their labor supply curves. This 
means that the labor supply of those who report rationing is treated as a 
latent variable. Therefore, a basic hypothesis is that once quantitative con-
straints are recognized and properly addressed, we may expect to ﬁ  nd that 
the underlying (latent) labor supply is more responsive to economic incen-
tives than in the standard model. However, the results do not show strong 
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4.3.4    Social  Norms
The standard labor supply model assumes atomistic behavior—that indi-
viduals make their labor supply decisions in isolation from one another. 
There is a growing literature that merges economic and sociological per-
spectives. One class of models incorporates social norms by augmenting 
individual preferences to depend on actions (and/  or preferences) of others. 
Thus, utility declines as the individual’s behavior deviates from the average 
choice within the group. Individual actions determine their own consump-
tion but with possible spillover eﬀects on others operating through the group 
choice. Moreover, multiple equilibria are possible and likely, as both Lind-
beck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a, 2001b) 
show. Small changes of individual behavior operating through the social 
norm can magnify, leading to large changes in observed outcomes—at least 
over a longer time perspective. Thus, social multipliers may arise, much like 
the old investment multiplier of Keynesian economics in which the total 
eﬀect of investment is larger than the individual marginal eﬀect.
To exemplify, consider a slight modiﬁ  cation of the utility function previ-
ously used, u(c, h, h ; z), where h  is interpretable as the average hours of work 
in the reference group with which the individual compares himself or herself. 
This variable may reﬂ  ect a utility loss of deviating from a social norm regard-
ing work hours (which here is assumed to be reﬂ  ected in the average hours 
of work). In addition, to simplify the calculations, suppose that the utility 
function is such that the resulting labor supply function takes the form
(2)  h    wn  yn  	h   
z.
The parameters  and  reﬂ  ect the inﬂ  uence on hours of work of a change 
in the marginal wage rate and the virtual nonlabor income, respectively, 
conditional on h . In the present context, these are only partial eﬀects; a social 
multiplier exists, in the sense that if the marginal wage rate and the virtual 
nonlabor income facing all individuals would change (e.g., if the tax system 
is subject to reforms), so would the average hours of work in the reference 
group. Therefore, the total eﬀect of a proportional increase in the marginal 
wage rate is  /   (1 –   	), where 	 ∈ [0,1), and 1 /   (1 -   	) is the social multiplier. 
If 	 is large, we may expect substantial indirect eﬀects via the presence of 
interdependent behavior. Therefore, in the standard labor supply model, if at 
least part of the eﬀect of h  is hidden in the constant, we may underestimate 
the total response to a change in the tax system.
The study of interdependent behavior in the context of labor supply 
models has a rich history.8 Using Swedish data referring to prime-  age mar-
ried men, a variant of the model previously set out has been estimated by 
8. See, for example, Kapteyn (1977), Alessie and Kapteyn (1991), and Woittiez and Kapteyn 
(1998). See also Manski (1993) for a thorough analysis of identiﬁ  cation and Brock and Durlauf 
(2001a, 2001b) for a partial solution.138        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
Aronsson, Blomquist, and Sacklén (1999). The results show that interdepen-
dent behavior is present and that it aﬀects the labor supply. In addition, the 
eﬀects are estimated to be sizeable; in terms of equation (2), the point esti-
mate of 	 is around 0.67. The partial wage and income elasticities evaluated 
at the mean of the data, w n /   h  and y n /   h , are equal to 0.061 and –  0.017, 
respectively, which resemble (or fall slightly short of) those found in earlier 
studies, which do not address interdependent behavior. The corresponding 
estimates of the full elasticities, w n /   [(1 –   	)h ] and y n /   [(1 –   	)h ], are 0.187 
and –  0.052, respectively. Taken at face value, these results suggest that the 
eﬀects of interdependent behavior are substantial and that the traditional 
labor supply model may imply considerable underestimation of the eﬀects 
of taxation.9 However, it is necessary to be careful in the interpretations, as 
we note the construction of social reference groups is arbitrary. The Monte 
Carlo simulations carried out by Aronsson, Blomquist, and Sacklén (1999) 
suggest that this is a potential problem; it may lead to the overestimation of 
	, which is the parameter of main interest.
Although not formally addressed in the previous example, the time 
dimension is possibly very important here. As a consequence, there is no 
formal distinction between short run and long run. In the short run, social 
norms are likely to constrain behavior—suggesting moderate behavioral 
responses to policy—whereas social norms may evolve gradually in the 
long run as a result of the behavior of all individuals. If this argument is 
correct, then the long-  run behavioral eﬀects—which also incorporate the 
eﬀects via changes in the social norm—will exceed those that follow in the 
short or medium run.
4.3.5      Tax Avoidance and the Choice of Assets
Clearly, many economists would expect the highly progressive income 
tax characterizing Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s to have caused serious 
disincentive eﬀects in terms of work hours. Yet, these expected behavioral 
responses were not found in the empirical work based on data for that time 
period (at least not for men). Can asset trade, which is carried out for the 
purpose of avoiding taxation, explain the seemingly moderate inﬂ  uence 
taxes have on the labor supply? If it can, then the tax tables may exagger-
ate the eﬀective degree of tax progression for certain groups of wage earn-
ers. We will formalize our argument by using a model developed by Agell 
and Persson (2000), which only requires a slight extension of the reference 
model previously set out. Consider an economy with two types of assets: a 
tax-  exempt asset and a taxable asset, the returns on which now constitute 
the nonlabor income part of the reference model. Let e denote the initial 
endowment, x the tax-  exempt asset, and d the taxable asset. Both assets are 
9. Some normative implications of social norms and social interaction in the labor market 
are analyzed by Aronsson and Sjögren (2009).Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 3 9
risk free, and we give the rates of return r for the taxable asset and  for the 
tax- exempt asset. By using the wealth constraint, d  e –  x, the optimization 







 u(c, h; z),
subject to wh  x  r(e –   x) –   T[wh  r(e –   x)] –   c  0, x  0.
We assume that T(￿) is such that T(￿)  0 and T(￿)  0 for wh  r(e –   x) 
 0. The tax system described here at least in part resembles the Swedish 
system before the 1983 tax reform, where negative asset income was fully 
deductible from labor income when calculating the taxable income. Exami-
nation of the ﬁ  rst-  order conditions suggests that when the pretax wage rate 
is suﬃciently high, x  0, whereas x  0 for lower pretax wage rates. If the 
individual decides not to use the tax-  exempt asset, then the labor supply 
takes the same form as in the reference model previously described. On the 
other hand, if the individual decides to place part of his or her endowment 
in the tax-  exempt asset, the hours of work choice will obey the following 
condition:




  uh(c, h; z)  0.
The labor supply implicit in equation (3) takes the form h  h(w /  r, y ˆ, z), 
where y ˆ denotes the virtual nonlabor income. This result has a very interest-
ing implication; conditional on the ratio between the rates of return,  /   r, a 
small tax reform will only give rise to an income eﬀect. In other words, there 
is a distinction in terms of labor supply between tax avoiders and those who 
do not use the possibility to adjust their marginal income tax rate via the 
tax-  exempt asset. For avoiders who lower their eﬀective marginal income 
tax rate via avoidance behavior, the statutory marginal income tax rates 
exaggerate the distortions imposed by the income tax system. Therefore, 
avoiders in a sense will create their own labor supply incentives, suggesting 
that the work disincentives associated with the tax system may not have been 
as great as they may have appeared from the tax tables in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
Empirical research based on the Swedish tax system from the 1980s sug-
gests that people responded to the incentives associated with tax avoidance; 
individuals with high labor income were found to be more inclined to have 
tax-  favored assets than those with lower labor income (Edin, Englund, and 
Ekman 1995). Similarly, a decline in indebtedness seems to have taken place 
after the 1991 tax reform was implemented (Agell, Englund, and Södersten 
1998). These results are interpretable as supporting the idea that individuals 
choose their portfolios in order to avoid taxation, which in turn may have 
implications for their labor supply behavior. In addition and perhaps even 
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may expect taxation to have a larger eﬀect on taxable income than on hours 
of work.
4.4      Sickness Insurance and Family Policy
A distinguishing feature of the Swedish social insurance system is its two-
  part structure—nearly every program oﬀers some minimal or guaranteed 
beneﬁ  t and another component that replaces a fraction of earnings. For 
example, the sickness insurance, parental insurance, and unemployment 
insurance systems all have this feature. The work-  conditioned beneﬁ  ts are 
distinctly more generous than the guaranteed beneﬁ  ts and oﬀer a strong 
incentive for employment. Yet, the existence of the work-  conditioned ben-
eﬁ  ts requires that we distinguish between contract or paid hours of employ-
ment and active hours of work—hours spent working to produce a good 
or service. The 2005 OECD country report on Sweden does this, and the 
results are striking. Workers in Sweden were on the job and actively work-
ing an average 35.4 weeks per year, while the average for Europe was 40.7 
weeks. The number of weeks away from work due to holidays varied little 
across countries in Europe. Hence, the primary diﬀerence in annual hours 
worked in Sweden versus the European average was in weeks absent for 
other reasons. In Sweden, the average number of weeks absent (excluding 
holidays) was more than twice the average for Europe (9.8 versus 4.5). We 
next explore some of the features of the social insurance programs that may 
give rise to this diﬀerence.
4.4.1    Sickness  Insurance
Recent reforms that require increased medical documentation of illnesses 
and that require employers to pay sickness beneﬁ  ts for the ﬁ  rst two weeks 
of absence were intended to increase the monitoring of usage and thereby 
to tighten control over beneﬁ  t costs. Nevertheless, use of sickness insurance 
beneﬁ  ts continues to remain high in Sweden.
Using the conceptual framework presented in section 4.3, it is straight-
forward to explain the eﬀect of sickness insurance beneﬁ  ts on labor supply. 
As we mentioned, demand- side considerations (e.g., setup costs and returns 
to coordination) may dictate the number of hours per period that must be 
supplied. Jobs can be seen as a tied sale of bundled attributes of which hours 
of work is only one of many attributes describing the working conditions 
and the nature of the job. Workers select the job that gives them the highest 
utility. Because it is cheaper to do so, employers have an incentive to oﬀer 
job packages that workers prefer. Nevertheless, technology limits the choices 
available, and some workers may select jobs with required hours of work that 
are greater than desired (as deﬁ  ned by the labor supply function in equation 
[1]). Access to sickness insurance beneﬁ  ts permits workers to adjust their 
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qualifying period and less- than- full replacement rate means the adjustment 
will be less than complete. In this interpretation, there is nothing stochastic 
or unexpected about the use of sickness insurance—the worker accepts the 
job demanding a ﬁ  xed number of hours, knowing he or she can adjust the 
level of eﬀort downward through the use of sickness insurance.
Building on the same structure, we can view the labor supply function in 
equation (1) as implicitly deﬁ  ning the (unrestricted) supply price of labor. 
Inverting equation (1) gives wn  g– 1(h, yn; zn), where wn is the worker’s ask-
ing price (net of taxes and transfers) to supply h units of labor at a given 
level of eﬀort or intensity. We can think that the eﬀort required on the job 
may vary over the business cycle, with more eﬀort requested in expansions 
and less in economic contractions. Once again, sickness insurance beneﬁ  ts 
permit the worker to moderate the demands over the cycle. This framework 
implies that we should see a procyclical use of sickness beneﬁ  ts—the num-
ber of sick days should increase when demand for labor is high and should 
decline when demand for labor is low. We reported in Aronsson and Walker 
(1997) that from 1967 (when the three-  day qualifying period was reduced 
to a single day) through the early 1990s, usage of sickness cash beneﬁ  ts has 
been strongly procyclical, with the simple correlation of unemployment and 
sick days as high as –  0.7.
Henrekson and Persson (2004) investigate the responsiveness of sick days 
to the major reforms of the sickness insurance system from 1968 to 2002. 
The National Insurance Board (RFV) reports sick days funded by the na-
tional sickness insurance system. These register data undercount the true 
number of sick days during the 1990s, as occupation sickness insurance 
plans oﬀered additional coverage that partially oﬀset the cost of the quali-
fying period and that covered earnings above the basic amount threshold 
of the national system. Henrekson and Persson’s aggregate time- series data 
do not permit parameterizing the reforms in terms of their direct monetary 
incentives. Instead, the authors code the reforms by time-  varying indicator 
variables and limit their analysis to only the major reforms. They adopt a 
distributed lag speciﬁ  cation, with the number of sick days as the dependent 
variable, and they include controls for the age composition of the working 
population, the gender mix, and the unemployment rate as regressors. They 
ﬁ  nd that sick days and unemployment are negatively related. Indeed, they 
ﬁ  nd the 1991 reform, which increased the length of the qualifying period 
and reduced beneﬁ  ts, caused sick days to decline by 20 percent. The careful 
and thorough analysis provides compelling evidence of the link between 
the structure and generosity of the sickness insurance plan and the hours 
of work.
4.4.2      Social Norms and Transfer Programs
Recall our earlier discussion of social norms on hours of work, where we 
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over the longer run, they may generate larger eﬀects. This is so for two rea-
sons. First, the social multiplier may take time to work as individuals learn 
about reference group behavior. And second, social norms may evolve over 
time, providing an internal dynamic for changing behavior. Lindbeck and 
his coauthors (Lindbeck 1995; Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull 1999, 2003) 
consider economies in which agents either work or receive a transfer pay-
ment and consume full leisure. Program participation entails a psychic cost 
(stigma), which is a decreasing function of the population living oﬀ beneﬁ  ts. 
As is common in models with social interaction, multiple equilibria exist. 
If the social norm for work is strong, with high psychic costs for those who 
deviate, then a good equilibrium with high program beneﬁ  ts and low free 
riding can be supported. Another bad equilibrium entails low beneﬁ  ts and 
high free riding. Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) show that these 
extreme equilibria are stable compared to intermediate ones with moderate 
levels of program beneﬁ  ts and free riding. Shelling (1971) was the ﬁ  rst to see 
that such economies may experience tipping, in which a small (exogenous) 
perturbation can shift the economy from one equilibrium to another.
Such extreme behavior has not been observed in Sweden, though its pos-
sibility is daunting. Consider the type of dynamic response in which the 
social norm depends on past program usage. An increased usage of program 
beneﬁ  ts today reduces the stigma of living oﬀ beneﬁ  ts tomorrow. Higher 
free riding tomorrow further lowers the cost. The tipping phenomenon is 
more gradual, but the system gravitates from the good equilibrium to the 
bad one.
The OECD (2005) reports that on an average day in Sweden, 14 percent 
of the working-  age population is on sick leave or disability insurance. Fig-
ure 4.4 shows that the proportion of the population not at work increased 
dramatically during the early 1990s and remained at the higher level into the 
early 2000s. Disability claims show increases among women and those of 
younger ages. In our 1997 paper, we discussed intergenerational diﬀerences 
in the use of sick leave, where the results suggest that young people’s usage 
of sick leave may be less related to medical need than to work preferences. 
All these ﬁ  gures point to a weakening of collective work ethic and to the 
decline of a social norm against free riding on social insurance programs. 
The OECD (2005) recognized this shift and called for a “change in the cul-
ture of sickness and disability” to one of “mutual obligation” to get the sick 
and disabled back to work as quickly as possible. If norms erode too much 
and a tipping point is reached, even more radical reforms will be needed.
All insurance programs face issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003) note the diﬃculty of the insurance 
provider to develop objective criteria to distinguish between the deserv-
ing (unlucky) and undeserving (free riders) beneﬁ  ciaries. When suﬃciently 
strong, social norms may be a cost- eﬃcient way of limiting free riding. Lind-
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itly by individuals who are close to the beneﬁ  ciaries and who have better 
information than do program administrators. And enforcement of the social 
norms may operate through a variety of social channels, unconstrained by 
the formal rules and procedures that restrict program administrators. A 
hidden cost of weakening social norms against free riding on social insur-
ance programs, especially sickness and disability insurance, will be increased 
administrative costs for additional monitoring and enforcement. In addi-
tion, stricter enforcement may imply that some of the truly needy will be 
denied beneﬁ  ts.
The social cost of continuing to allow easy access to generous social insur-
ance programs is large. Getting people back to work has a twofold beneﬁ  t of 
increased output and lower tax rates to cover the reduced program expendi-
ture. Harder to measure are the reduced deadweight losses associated with 
the lower tax rates. We recognize these costs and realize the challenge encom-
passes the design of social insurance programs and their administration.
4.4.3    Parental  Beneﬁ  ts
Historically, Sweden has been one of the leaders in oﬀering beneﬁ  ts con-
nected to childbearing and child rearing. Sweden oﬀers subsidies to defray 
the medical costs of childbearing and child allowances to oﬀset child- related 
expenditures necessary for young children and adolescents. As part of its 
family policy, parental beneﬁ  ts oﬀer either parent subsidies to stay home 
with the child. It is important to recognize that parental beneﬁ  ts are one 
component of family policy and have the intended role of helping parents, 
primarily women, to balance the demands of family and the workplace. 
Thus, an evaluation of their eﬀects requires a broader perspective than 
simply their incentive eﬀects on labor supply. Even on labor supply, the 
eﬀects are complicated and somewhat oﬀsetting. Of course, upon child-
birth, parental beneﬁ  ts oﬀset the cost of leaving the market and will increase 
time away from work. Within the OECD framework previously described, 
absences while on parental beneﬁ  ts fall within the “absent for other reasons” 
category. However, guaranteed beneﬁ  t levels are so low that prospective 
parents have an incentive to enter the labor market prior to each birth.10 
Empirical studies are few,11 but the net eﬀect for labor supply is likely to be 
negative, particularly as the entitlement period is substantially shorter than 
the beneﬁ  t period.
The recent OECD country report on Sweden is critical of the level of 
parental beneﬁ  ts in Sweden, labeling the beneﬁ  ts as very generous and ques-
tioning their value on child development and welfare. We recognize the likely 
10. See Mortensen (1977) for an elegant early analysis of entitlement eﬀects that evaluates 
the employment eﬀects of unemployment insurance within the United States.
11. See Walker (1996) for an (unsuccessful) attempt to measure the eﬀects of parental beneﬁ  ts 
on fertility and female employment. Fertility is not completely controllable, and to the extent 
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disincentive eﬀects on labor supply, but we are less critical of the current 
generosity of parental beneﬁ  ts. Households and individuals make decisions 
within the current and anticipated social insurance programs. For example, 
private-  savings decisions are made with knowledge of the beneﬁ  t levels of 
the public pension system, and fertility decisions are made when anticipating 
the programs and subsidies available to families with children. Reductions 
in child-  related subsidies and programs that are interpreted as signaling 
the future policies to be even less supportive to families with children may 
decrease fertility. In light of Sweden’s aging population, policies that may 
lower fertility merit further attention.
4.5    Public  Pensions
Sweden retains its position as leader in innovative social insurance pro-
grams with its pension reform of 1999 that completely restructured the 
public pension system. The prereform pension system was a pay-  as-  you-  go 
(PAYG) deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t system that had two components: a basic pension 
and a supplemental pension. The basic pension oﬀered income security and 
established the minimum income ﬂ  oor for all workers. The supplement pen-
sion augmented the basic pension and targeted payments to replace about 
60 percent of the worker’s labor market earnings. Under the supplemental 
pension system, beneﬁ  ts were tied to the worker’s highest earnings over ﬁ  f-
teen years, and to obtain a full supplement beneﬁ  t, an individual had to 
work thirty years. Over time, however, beneﬁ  ts became more generous, life 
expectancies rose, and birthrates fell. Thus, pensioners had to be supported 
for more years and were entitled to more generous beneﬁ  ts, with a declining 
worker base to support them. These changes necessitated either large tax 
increases or a signiﬁ  cant cut in beneﬁ  ts.
4.5.1    The  1999  Reform
The Swedish pension reform of 1999 oﬀers an innovative and in many 
ways radical solution to these problems.12 The largest change is that the 
public pension system switched from a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to a notional deﬁ  ned 
contribution (NDC) system. In the new system, workers have an indi-
vidual account, which receives each year a pension contribution equal to 
18.5 percent of their pensionable income. Now, instead of guaranteed ben-
eﬁ  ts upon retirement, workers have guaranteed contributions credited each 
year to their accounts. It is notional because workers’ accounts are only 
credited; actual assets are not set aside. Balances in the account earn a rate 
of return each year equal to annual growth in average wages. Upon retire-
12. Like the previous system, the new pension system will be phased in over a number of 
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ment (after age sixty-  one), the individual’s accumulated notional wealth 
is converted into an annuity, dependent on the life expectancy of the indi-
vidual’s cohort.
A second innovation of the 1999 reform introduced limited individual 
control over the pension. Contributions equal to 16 percentage points go 
into the national public pension fund, which is managed by the govern-
ment. The remaining 2.5 percent contribution is mandatory; however, these 
funds are under the individual’s control. Hence, the government will collect 
all revenues and will disperse payouts, although the individual funds will 
be managed by private investment ﬁ  rms that are selected by the individual 
from an approved list of investment advisors. The last innovation is a sig-
niﬁ  cant broadening of the income base entering the public pension system. 
Besides earnings, the 1999 reforms recognized additional social insurance 
payments as part of the income base. This includes stipends to students pur-
suing postsecondary education and parental beneﬁ  ts. Indeed, child-  rearing 
activities earn supplemental contributions, as does income while serving in 
the military.
The Swedish pension system remains a pay- as- you- go pension system, as 
tax contributions paid by those currently working are used to ﬁ  nance the 
pension payments of those currently retired. At an 18.5 percent contribu-
tion rate, the system’s designers expect the new pension system to deliver 
pension beneﬁ  ts at about the same level as the old system. An interesting 
political compromise rests with the 18.5 percent contribution rate. Consen-
sus estimates within the public debate was that a 16 percent contribution 
would suﬃce to maintain the (then) existing level of pension beneﬁ  ts. Yet, 
to ensure income security, a higher contribution rate was accepted, with the 
stipulation that the remaining funds were under individual control.
The new pension system represents a striking departure from Sweden’s 
long history of guaranteed beneﬁ  ts and horizontal equity. Under the new 
system, diﬀerent cohorts will receive diﬀerent pensions for the same accumu-
lated pension wealth as life expectancies change. Members of the same birth 
cohort will receive diﬀerent pensions for the same life expectancy should the 
individuals retire in diﬀerent years (and thus have the opportunity to accu-
mulate diﬀerent levels of pension wealth to annuitize at retirement). Finally, 
and the most individual speciﬁ  c, the individual accounts will accumulate 
wealth based on the individual’s investment strategy. Individuals adopting 
more conservative portfolios may accrue less wealth than those who adopt 
more aggressive portfolios. Government oversight of the fund managers 
and restrictions on the types of investments permitted reduce this form of 
variability, and it may be more symbolic than real. Yet, within a social insur-
ance system founded on the notion of horizontal equity in which alikes are 
treated alike, this source of individual-  level diversity is a striking departure 
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4.5.2      Pensions and Labor Supply
There is a vast empirical literature on the old pension system13 and very 
little (because of its newness) on the 1999 pension reform. We note, however, 
that between 1999 and 2004, labor force participation rates increased among 
the elderly (ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four). Future research will determine whether 
the work incentives created by the 1999 pension reform increased these rates. 
We oﬀer some observations that suggest it may have.
The shift from the old deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t PAYG system to the notional deﬁ  ned 
contribution system will induce both short- run and long- run eﬀects on labor 
supply. In the long run, as Lindbeck (2002) and Feldstein and Leibman 
(2002) show, a notional or quasifunded beneﬁ  t system can reduce the distor-
tionary incentive eﬀects caused by a tax on labor to ﬁ  nance beneﬁ  ts. That is, 
in a PAYG system in which there is no relationship between taxes paid and 
beneﬁ  ts eventually received, the implicit rate of return on tax contribution 
is minus 100 percent, and the deadweight loss reﬂ  ects the entire pension tax 
on labor income. Under an NDC, taxes and beneﬁ  ts are related, as taxes 
paid are returned as future beneﬁ  ts, with an implicit rate of return equal 
to the growth rate of the population multiplied by the growth rate of labor 
income. If the implicit rate of return on pension contributions is close to the 
rate of return on other forms of savings the individual could make other-
wise, the distortion of labor supply is much reduced. Indeed, if the implicit 
rate of return exactly equals the return on other forms of savings, then 
the distortion on labor supply is zero. Lindbeck and Persson (2003) show 
that for reasonable growth rates, the reduction in the tax wedge on labor 
income could be as much as 10 percentage points. The reduction in marginal 
tax rates should therefore increase labor supply (via participation, hours, 
and quality). The reduction of deadweight loss generated by the NDC may 
potentially improve welfare for both young and old generations.14
The short-  term labor supply incentive eﬀects are more transparent. The 
switch from a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to a deﬁ  ned contribution plan changes the 
nature of pension accruals. Under the NDC, another year of work will 
increase pension wealth because of the direct contribution from earnings, 
the return on accumulated contributions, and if the person is past normal 
retirement age, the increased annuity values for shorter beneﬁ  t period. In the 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t system, the pension depends on years of employment and 
average earnings over the highest ﬁ  fteen years of earnings. For someone with 
the same level of pension wealth and with fewer than thirty years of employ-
13. See the various studies by Mårten Palme; for example, Palme and Svensson (2004).
14. Importantly, the introduction of the deﬁ  ned contribution plan converts entitlements 
to contributions made rather than to beneﬁ  ts to be paid. Hence, the government is protected 
from having to guarantee beneﬁ  ts in the presence of increasing life expectancies and below-
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ment or with earnings above their ﬁ  fteenth-  highest earnings, an additional 
year of employment thus would increase the annuity paid at retirement by 
increasing either the replacement rate or the average earnings (or both) used 
within the beneﬁ  t formula. However, most workers near retirement age have 
worked for more than thirty years and thus under the deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t system 
have weak incentives to continue working. Therefore, the reformed Swedish 
pension plan now oﬀers stronger work incentives, especially to those with 
persistent labor market attachment.
Yet, one cautionary remark is in order. Palme and Svensson (2002) esti-
mate that approximately 20 percent of men and 27 percent of women exit 
the labor market via the social insurance programs. Under the 1999 reform, 
social insurance income is pensionable and thus may exacerbate this ten-
dency. Moreover, recent work on social norms suggests that this problem is 
even more pernicious.
4.6      Other Aspects of the Tax Base
So far, we mainly have focused on hours of work. From a tax revenue 
perspective, it is of interest to understand how and why taxation aﬀects 
before-  tax income. In addition, by extending the analysis to before-  tax 
income, several additional mechanisms will appear; for instance, in addition 
to hours of work, before- tax income also reﬂ  ects eﬀort, occupational choice, 
wage formation, and possibly also tax avoidance. By Seldrod’s hierarchy of 
response, we may expect taxable income to respond diﬀerently to tax policy 
changes in comparison with hours of work.
4.6.1      The Relationship between Marginal Tax Rates 
and Before-  Tax Income
The literature on tax base determination, initiated by Lindsay (1987) and 
further developed by Feldstein (1995), oﬀers an interesting complement to 
the traditional study of labor supply, because it allows us to address several 
aspects of behavior simultaneously. In other words, although the frame-
work for studying tax base determination typically resembles the traditional 
labor supply model, it does not restrict its attention solely to hours of work. 
Depending on the deﬁ  nition of income, it also (at least in principle) may 
capture avoidance, as well as the eﬀects of tax policy on the gross wage rate, 
eﬀort, occupational choice, and savings. Therefore, part of the diﬀerence 
in results among studies likely is to be due to diﬀerences regarding the way 
in which income is measured—for example, whether the analysis refers to 
taxable income or a broader income concept.
In their comprehensive study on tax base determination in the United 
States, Gruber and Saez (2002) make a distinction between two income 
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the sum of all items that compose total income less capital gains.15 A basic 
hypothesis is that taxable income is more sensitive to marginal taxation 
than is broad income, because changes in taxable income also reﬂ  ect (some 
aspects of) tax avoidance. Indeed, this is precisely what Gruber and Saez 
ﬁ  nd. First, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate 
(measured as one minus the marginal tax rate) is estimated to be around 0.4 
on average.16 The corresponding elasticity for broad income is 0.07. Second, 
income eﬀects are very small, implying that the uncompensated and com-
pensated eﬀects on the before-  tax income of a change in the net of tax rate 
are similar. Third, the eﬀect on taxable income of a change in the net of tax 
rate appears to be strongest in the upper part of the income distribution.
There are several studies based on Swedish data dealing with the inﬂ  uence 
of marginal tax rates on before-  tax income. Let us start by brieﬂ  y discuss-
ing a paper by Ljunge and Ragan (2004). Instead of considering taxable 
income and broad income, respectively, as in the paper by Gruber and Saez, 
Ljunge and Ragan focus their attention on the determinants of labor earn-
ings. Although this choice of dependent variable means neglecting some 
of the possible eﬀects of taxation due to tax avoidance, it nevertheless will 
reﬂ  ect the joint eﬀect of taxation on several interesting aspects of behavior. 
As such, we may expect the behavioral responses to be diﬀerent from those 
presented for work hours. Ljunge and Ragan use panel data and focus on 
individuals aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve during 1989. Their study period is 
from 1989 to 1994, meaning that attention is paid to the 1991 tax reform in 
terms of its eﬀect on labor earnings. The results imply that the compensated 
elasticity of earnings with respect to the net of tax rate is around 0.33 on 
average, which is a relatively large response. (Recall that the corresponding 
elasticity for taxable income in the United States is measured to be around 
0.4 by Gruber and Saez.) The uncompensated elasticity of labor earnings 
with respect to the net of tax rate is estimated to be in the interval of 0.25 to 
0.33. In addition, there is considerable variation across groups. For instance, 
both low-  income earners and high-  income earners have higher estimated 
elasticities than income earners in the middle of the distribution. On average, 
the estimated behavioral response to the 1991 tax reform is an increase in 
earnings by 10 to 15 percent.
Using panel data for the years 1989 and 1992 and focusing on the group 
aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty in 1989, Hansson (2004) estimates the elasticity of 
15. Broad income contains wages, salaries and tips, interest income, dividends, alimony 
received, business income, total Individual Retirement Account (IRA) distributions, total pen-
sions and annuities, income reported on schedule E, farm income, unemployment income, and 
other income.
16. This number is an average estimate in comparison with earlier literature. Studies concen-
trating on the upper part of the income distribution typically estimate a higher number. On the 
other hand, some earlier studies that do not refer to the United States seem to imply a much 
weaker relationship between marginal tax rates and taxable income; see, for instance, Aarbu 
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taxable labor income with respect to the net of tax rate to be 0.43 or 0.57 on 
average, depending on the choice of instruments for the net of tax rate. She 
also ﬁ  nds that the relevant elasticity may diﬀer considerably across groups 
(with women being more responsive than men in at least one of the models). 
However, because she does not incorporate a measure of virtual income in 
the analysis, it is not clear whether the relevant elasticity estimate should 
be interpreted as a compensated or an uncompensated eﬀect. The results 
also appear to be somewhat sensitive to the use of the estimation method 
(the choice of instrument for the marginal tax rate). Selén (2002) estimates 
a model similar to that of Gruber and Saez using data for the period from 
1989 to 1992. He concentrates the analysis to men in the group aged twenty-
 ﬁ ve to ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve in 1989. His results imply a slightly lower estimate of the 
(compensated) elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate, 
in the interval of 0.2 to 0.4. Finally, Blomquist and Sehlin (2008) estimate 
how taxable labor earnings as well as the hourly gross wage rate depend on 
the net of tax rate. By using data for 1981 and 1991, their preferred estimates 
imply that the elasticity of taxable earnings with respect to the net of tax rate 
is 0.26 for men and 0.75 for women (again indicating that women respond 
more to tax policy than do men), whereas the corresponding elasticities for 
the hourly gross wage rates are 0.20 and 0.33, respectively.17 We will return 
to the relationship between gross wage rates and the tax system next.
Although we believe that the study of how marginal tax rates aﬀect before-
  tax income is interesting in the sense that it provides a broader view of tax 
responses than the traditional study of labor supply, it is important to be 
careful when interpreting these results. This is so for at least two reasons. 
First, this research area is relatively new by comparison—at least when 
applied to Swedish data. To be useful for purposes of policy evaluations 
and recommendations, these studies should be supplemented by additional 
research.18 Second, and more importantly, the theoretical foundations for 
the study of before-  tax income is not always convincing; the income supply 
model by Gruber and Saez is only one possible model, and it resembles the 
17. Blomquist and Sehlin also recognize that responses to tax policy are likely to be asym-
metric; for instance, although a decrease in the marginal tax rate may lead to additional invest-
ments in human capital or a move toward jobs with higher wages, an increase in the marginal 
tax rate is not likely to lead to disinvestment in skills or moves toward jobs with lower pay. 
Indeed, when reestimating their models using similar data for other time periods, they obtain 
results that diﬀer substantially from those referred to earlier.
18. As we previously mentioned, most earlier Swedish studies use the 1991 tax reform to 
identify the eﬀects of marginal taxation on the before-  tax income. An exception is Holmlund 
and Söderström (2008), who use data for the postreform period from 1991 to 2002; in addition, 
they consider a dynamic regression model, which allows them to distinguish between short- run 
and long-  run eﬀects of a change in the net of tax rate. For men, the estimates of the long-  run 
elasticity of income with respect to the net of tax rate typically are found in the interval of 
0.1 to 0.3, whereas the estimates for women are imprecise and statistically insigniﬁ  cant. They 
also calculate the ﬁ  scal consequences of a reform that reduces the top marginal income tax 
rate by 5 percentage points, and they ﬁ  nd that this reform is likely to have only a minor eﬀect 
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labor supply model too much to provide a very interesting alternative. For 
instance, the income supply model itself is silent about important issues 
such as wage formation, as well as about the opportunities and constraints 
underlying avoidance behavior. As a consequence, we may not learn much 
about the mechanisms underlying behavior by studying only the relation-
ships discussed here.
4.6.2      Wages, Taxes, and Tax Progression
One reason as to why marginal income taxation causes a larger response 
in the tax base than in the hours of work was discussed in section 4.3, where 
we argued that individuals may adjust to taxation via tax avoidance, which 
in turn tends to diminish the eﬀects of taxation on hours of work. Alongside 
this explanation, empirical evidence also suggests that the wage formation 
system may contribute to explain the apparently large eﬀect on the tax base 
following the 1991 tax reform. If the pretax wage rates are determined by 
bargaining between unions and ﬁ  rms, which is common in European labor 
markets, standard models for wage setting, as well as some of the empirical 
evidence associated with them, predict that an increase (a decrease) in the 
marginal tax rate with the average tax rate held constant leads to decreased 
(increased) pretax wage rates.19 The intuition is based on a tradeoﬀ (which 
the trade union is assumed to be facing) between the consumption wage per 
employed member and the number of employed members: a higher marginal 
tax rate tends to increase the opportunity cost of wage increases in terms 
of lost employment. On the other hand, a change in the average tax rate 
with the marginal tax rate held constant may either increase or decrease the 
pretax wage rate.
Let us discuss studies based on Swedish data. Holmlund and Kolm (1995) 
use data from the Swedish income distribution surveys (HINK) which 
include time series data for diﬀerent income groups, as well as microlevel 
panel data.20 In the panel data regressions, the results suggest that an increase 
in the marginal tax rate of 10 percentage points will reduce the pretax wage 
by about 4 to 6 percent for the average worker with the average tax rate held 
constant, whereas the corresponding number in the time series regression 
is around –  2.5 percent. There is also evidence suggesting that this eﬀect 
is stronger among the highest income earners. Aronsson, Wikström, and 
Brännlund (1997) estimate a union wage model based on panel data at the 
ﬁ  rm level for the Swedish pulp and paper industry. Their results imply that 
with the average tax rate held constant, the elasticity of the pretax wage rate 
with respect to the marginal tax rate is –  0.5 on average. The corresponding 
elasticity with respect to the average tax rate (with the marginal tax rate held 
constant) is estimated to be 0.5.
19. Normative implications of unionized labor markets are analyzed, for example, by Fuest 
and Huber (1997) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a, 2004b).
20. Their model essentially is based on the seminal work by Lockwood and Manning (1993).Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 5 1
Despite arguments for caution,21 it is tempting to compare the results 
on tax progression and wage formation with those discussed earlier on the 
determinants of the hours of work and before- tax income, respectively. Such 
a comparison provides at least one possible explanation as to why the labor 
earnings most likely increased more than the hours of work as a result of the 
1991 income tax reform. In addition, this argument is further strengthened 
(from yet another perspective) by Blomquist and Sehlin (2008), who show 
that the diﬀerence between the tax base elasticity and the wage rate elastic-
ity for men previously referred to is very close to the typical labor supply 
elasticity estimated in earlier studies (indicating that the study of tax base 
determination gives results that are consistent with the labor supply litera-
ture). Interestingly, therefore, their results suggest that the response in labor 
earnings to a change in the marginal tax rate that is due to the response in 
the wage rate is more important than the response in the hours of work—at 
least for men.
4.7    Cross-  Country  Comparisons
Most earlier studies on work hours, and particularly on how hours of 
work respond to taxation, transfer payments, and social insurance, are based 
on within- country microdata. More recently, however, several studies22 have 
emerged with the explicit purpose of explaining cross-  country diﬀerences, 
with a focus on diﬀerences between Europe and the United States. These 
diﬀerences have increased in general since the early 1970s and are now sub-
stantial: Americans tend to do much more market work than Europeans 
do. An important question is whether the diﬀerences in work hours between 
Europe and the United States can be explained by diﬀerences in taxation and 
transfer programs or whether they are (mainly) attributable to other factors, 
such as labor market institutions and legislation.
Diﬀerences between Europe and the United States with respect to work 
hours per person have been analyzed, for example, by Prescott (2004) and 
Olovsson (2004) in the context of numerical general equilibrium models. 
From our perspective, the study by Olovsson is particularly interesting, as 
it deals explicitly with a comparison between Sweden and the United States. 
Olovsson makes a distinction between market work and household produc-
tion: the main diﬀerence between the two countries refers to how the house-
holds divide their time between market work and household production 
(more time is spent on market work and less time in household production in 
21. Note that these strong results are not conﬁ  rmed fully by more recent research based on 
data for other countries. For instance, by using Danish data, Lockwood, Slök, and Tranaes 
(2000) ﬁ  nd evidence suggesting that the eﬀects of higher tax progression on the pretax wage 
rate is income dependent. Similarly, Brunello, Parisi, and Sonedda (2002) use Italian data and 
ﬁ  nd the opposite eﬀect in comparison with the Swedish studies previously referred to: tax 
progression works to increase the pretax wage rate.
22. See, for example, Davis and Henrekson (2004), Prescott (2004), Olovsson (2004), and 
Alesina, Glaesen, and Sacerdote (2005).152        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
the United States in comparison with Sweden), whereas the total time spent 
working is about the same in both countries. Olovsson uses an intertemporal 
model of a competitive economy, where preference and production param-
eters are set to reﬂ  ect Olovsson’s assessment of estimates in the empirical 
literature, whereas the policy parameters are chosen either to reﬂ  ect Sweden 
or the United States. This enables him to compare how diﬀerences in public 
policy between the two countries aﬀect the time spent in market work and 
household production, respectively. Adopting a long-  run perspective of 
comparing steady states, Olovsson shows that diﬀerences in public policy 
(and in particular, income taxation) between the two countries can explain 
the diﬀerences with respect to how the households divide their time between 
market work and household production: high marginal tax rates in Sweden 
induce individuals to substitute from market to nonmarket production, with 
the total hours of work virtually equal between the United States and Swe-
den. His model predicts a gradual reduction in the hours spent in market 
work in Sweden between 1960 and 1980, the direction of which is consistent 
with the observed behavior, although it overestimates the hours of market 
work per person at the beginning of the period (implying that the predicted 
reduction is greater than the reduction that actually took place).
Although it is likely that diﬀerences in tax policy between Sweden 
(or Europe, in the paper by Prescott) and the United States give rise to 
diﬀerences in the hours of work per person, there are at least three problems 
with the preceding analyses. First, the expenditure side of the government’s 
budget is dealt with in a somewhat superﬁ  cial way; neither Olovsson nor 
Prescott allow public consumption to enter the utility function, and both 
of them give the tax revenues (net of the useless public consumption) back 
to the consumers in the form of lump-  sum transfers. The latter weakens 
the income eﬀect so that the substitution eﬀect becomes dominant for the 
behavioral response to tax policy. Clearly, if the government spending (or 
part thereof) were not treated as a perfect substitute for private consump-
tion, the income eﬀect would tend to oﬀset the behavioral responses to tax 
policy—an argument also put forward in a comment by Ljungqvist (2006). 
Second, the social insurance system gives rise to its own incentives, which 
are likely to contribute to diﬀerences in the hours of work per person. For 
instance, diﬀerences between countries with respect to the generosity of 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts may imply diﬀerences in the incentives among the 
unemployed to actively search for employment. This aspect is particularly 
interesting in light of how the diﬀerence between Europe and the United 
States with regards to the hours of work per person refers to diﬀerences 
in terms of employment-  to-  population ratios. Although employment-  to-
  population ratios are generally lower in Europe than in the United States, 
the diﬀerences appear to be particularly large for the youngest and oldest age 
groups (see Gordon 2006). Generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts are likely to 
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with unemployment, it becomes more diﬃcult for the unemployed to ﬁ  nd 
acceptable jobs. This in turn may contribute to reduce the search intensity. 
(See also Ljungqvist and Sargent [2005], as well as their chapter 6 in this 
volume.) As it is less beneﬁ  cial for older individuals than for younger indi-
viduals to reinvest, this also suggests that generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
may have a relatively strong eﬀect on the incentives facing the unemployed 
elderly. It is also consistent with the estimates by Palme and Svensson (2002) 
that unemployment is an important pathway to early retirement in Sweden. 
Third, the literature focusing on diﬀerences in tax policy between Europe 
and the United States as an explanation to diﬀerences in terms of the hours 
of work is often silent about the labor market structure—an issue to which 
we turn next.
4.7.1      Market Structure and the Role of Unions
Is there econometric evidence in favor of the hypothesis that diﬀerences 
(between countries) in economic policy, and particularly in tax policy, are 
related to diﬀerences in hours of market work? The answer is yes; there are 
studies showing a negative correlation between hours of work per person 
and the (average) marginal income tax rate. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 
(2005) discuss the possibility that these observed correlations to some extent 
may be due to a missing variables problem. Their study focuses on diﬀerences 
in labor market institutions between the United States and Europe: Euro-
pean labor markets are often characterized by trade unions—which have a 
strong inﬂ  uence on wage formation and/ or serve as a pressure group behind 
the economic policy—whereas the inﬂ  uence of trade unions is much weaker 
in the United States. They use panel data for the OECD countries for the 
period from 1960 to 1995. If they disregard the diﬀerences in labor market 
characteristics previously discussed (in a way similar to earlier literature in 
this area), their results show a negative and signiﬁ  cant relationship between 
the marginal tax rate and the hours of work per person, which is consistent 
with the results previously mentioned. However, by adding a measure of 
union density (the fraction of union members in the labor force) and a mea-
sure of employment protection, this signiﬁ  cant result disappears; instead, 
both the union density and the employment protection variable show nega-
tive and signiﬁ  cant relationships with hours of work. Therefore, it seems as 
if unionization and regulations better explain diﬀerences between Europe 
and the United States than does the tax system.
The idea that unions are able to aﬀect work hours (either directly or 
indirectly via wage formation) becomes more plausible with stronger trade 
unions. Unions may engage in pressure group activities; due to diﬀerences 
in membership and/  or political strength, the expected return from doing so 
is likely to have been greater in some of the major European countries than 
in the United States. As such, unions may have had greater opportunity to 
aﬀect market outcomes, as well as legislation, in Europe.154        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
We do not want to draw strong conclusions from these results. This is so 
for several reasons. First, studies based on country- level data cannot provide 
as detailed descriptions of incentive eﬀects as the microstudies discussed 
before, meaning that direct comparisons are diﬃcult. Second, although 
union wage setting and measures of regulations may correlate with hours of 
work per person at the country level, so does the marginal tax rate, according 
to the results presented by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005). There-
fore, it very well may be the case that the tax and transfer systems, the social 
insurance system, and the institutional characteristics of the labor market 
all contribute to explain the diﬀerences with regard to work hours, and we 
are not yet able to establish which aspect is most important.
4.8    Summary  and  Discussion
Sweden’s diverse set of social insurance programs provides a high safety 
net for its citizens but requires a high rate of taxation. Social insurance pro-
grams create their own disincentives for market work. Historically, Sweden’s 
programs have been robust to individual malfeasance, yet there is emerging 
evidence that malfeasance is on the rise. The large and growing propor-
tion of the near-  retirement population on disability and sickness insurance 
beneﬁ  ts is disturbing and may mask other structural problems in the labor 
market. Equally worrisome, it seems that the disability and sickness insur-
ance programs are now entitlements rather than insurance.
The high tax rates necessary to fund the social insurance programs 
also create incentives against market work. The 1991 tax reform reduced 
marginal tax rates, but tax rates in Sweden remain high compared with 
non-  Nordic European countries and particularly the United States. The 
econometric literature ﬁ  nds little evidence that high marginal tax rates are 
reducing hours of work in Sweden. The literature oﬀers a variety of rea-
sons to explain why the distorting eﬀects of high tax rates may not appear 
in hours of work. However, while taxes may not have very large eﬀects on 
hours of work, there is emerging evidence that the high marginal tax rates 
do inﬂ  uence other choices that aﬀect before-  tax income. In the absence of 
any behavioral eﬀects, an increase in the marginal income tax should have 
no eﬀect on before- tax income. Recent estimates using Swedish data suggest 
that a 10 percent increase in marginal tax rate reduces before- tax income by 
3 to 4 percent.
International comparisons reveal that Swedes work fewer hours in the 
market than Americans do. The income guarantees oﬀered by the social 
insurance programs and high marginal tax rates are certainly part of the 
explanation, though there is far from a consensus on their relative impor-
tance. And it is easy to recommend that tax rates be lowered or that social 
insurance programs be reduced, but doing so would miss the Swedish per-
spective on the right level of social insurance. A fruitful approach is to Labor Supply, Tax Base, and Public Policy in Sweden    1 5 5
inquire whether the social insurance programs meet their original intent 
with the least social cost.
Sweden’s 1991 tax reform and the 1999 pension reform increased incen-
tives for market work. These reforms addressed politically contentious 
problems and illustrate Sweden’s remarkable ability to ﬁ  nd pragmatic public 
policy solutions. The challenge facing the Swedish welfare system is to keep 
enough people working enough hours to fund its generous beneﬁ  ts. To pre-
serve its high safety net, Sweden will need to increase self- insurance of small 
(short-  term) risks and may need to increase the monitoring of beneﬁ  ts to 




Study   Description   ew   ey
Results for men
Blomquist (1983) LNU 1973, married men 
aged 25–55
0.08 –0.04
Blomquist and Hansson- 
Brusewitz (1990)
LNU 1981, married men 
aged 25–55
(0.08, 0.12) (–0.13, 0.02)
Flood and MaCurdy (1992) HUS, married men aged 
25–55
(–0.24, 0.2) (–0.10, 0.04)
Aronsson and Palme (1998) LNU 1981, married 
couples aged 25–55
0.12 –0.03
Flood, Hansen, and 
Wahlberg (2004)
HINK 1993, 1999, married 
couples, each spouse 
younger than age 56
0.05 —
Blomquist, Eklöf, and 
Newey (2001)
LNU 1973, 1981, and 1991, 
married men aged 25–55
0.075 –0.04
Results for women
Blomquist and Hansson- 
Brusewitz (1990)
LNU 1981, married 
women aged 25–55
(0.38, 0.79) (–0.24, –0.03)
Aronsson and Palme (1998) LNU 1981, married 
couples aged 25–55
0.44 –0.12
Flood, Hansen, and 
Wahlberg (2004)
  HINK 1993, 1999, married 
couples, each spouse 
younger than age 56
  0.1   —
Note: The variable ew measures the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the own marginal wage 
rate, whereas ey is the labor supply elasticity with respect to the virtual nonlabor income. In some of the 
studies, the authors estimate several variants of the model, and the numbers refer to the intervals for the 
point estimates. LNU  Level of Living Survey; HUS  Swedish Panel Study on Market and Nonmar-
ket Activities; HINK  Swedish Household Income Survey.156        Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker
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